We give a detailed characterization of optimal trades under budget constraints in a prediction market with a cost-function-based automated market maker. We study how the budget constraints of individual traders affect their ability to impact the market price. As a concrete application of our characterization, we give sufficient conditions for a property we call budget additivity: two traders with budgets B and B and the same beliefs would have a combined impact equal to a single trader with budget B + B . That way, even if a single trader cannot move the market much, a crowd of like-minded traders can have the same desired effect. When the set of payoff vectors associated with outcomes, with coordinates corresponding to securities, is affinely independent, we obtain that a generalization of the heavily-used logarithmic market scoring rule is budget additive, but the quadratic market scoring rule is not. Our results may be used both descriptively, to understand if a particular market maker is affected by budget constraints or not, and prescriptively, as a recipe to construct markets.
INTRODUCTION
A prediction market is a central clearinghouse for people with differing opinions about the likelihood of an eventsay Hillary Clinton to win the 2016 U.S. Presidential election-to trade monetary stakes in the outcome with one another. At equilibrium, the price to buy a contract paying $1 if Clinton wins reflects a consensus of sorts on the probability of the event. At that price, and given the wagers already placed, no agent is willing to push the price further up or down. Prediction markets have a good track record of forecast accuracy in many domains [11, 19] .
The design of combinatorial markets spanning multiple logically-related events raises many interesting questions. What information can be elicited-the full probability distribution, or specific properties of the distribution? What securities can the market allow traders to buy and sell? How can the market support and ensure a variety of trades? For example, in addition to the likelihood of Clinton winning the election, we may want to elicit information about the distribution of her electoral votes. 1 If we create one security for each possible outcome between 0 and 538, each paying $1 iff Clinton gets exactly that many electoral votes, the market is called complete, allowing us to elicit a full probability distribution. Alternatively, if we create just two securities, one paying out $x if Clinton wins x electoral votes, and the other paying out $x 2 , we cannot elicit a full distribution, but we can still elicit the mean and variance of the number of electoral votes.
When agents are constrained in how much they can trade only by risk aversion, prediction market prices can be interpreted as a weighted average of traders' beliefs [2, 20] , a natural reflection of the "wisdom of the crowd" with a good empirical track record [14] and theoretical support [2] . However, when agents are budget constrained, discontinuities and idiosyncratic results can arise [7, 16] that call into question whether the equilibrium prices can be trusted to reflect any kind of useful aggregation.
We consider prediction markets with an automated market maker [1, 4, 13] that maintains standing offers to trade every security at some price. Unlike a peer-to-peer exchange, all transactions route through the market maker. The common market makers have bounded loss and are (myopically) incentive compatible: the best (immediate) strategy is for a trader to move the market prices of all securities to equal his own belief. The design of such an automated market maker boils down to choosing a convex cost function [1] . This amount of design freedom presents an opportunity to seek cost functions that satisfy additional desiderata such as computational tractability [1, 6] .
Most of the literature assumes either risk-neutral or riskaverse traders with unbounded budgets. In this paper, we consider how agents with budget constraints trade in such markets, a practical reality in almost all prediction markets denominated in both real and virtual currencies. Our results help with a systematic study of the market's liquidity parameter, or the parameter controlling the sensitivity of prices to trading volume. Setting the liquidity is a nearly universal practical concern and, at present, is more (black) art than science. We adopt the notion of the "natural budget constraint" introduced by Fortnow and Sami [8] : the agent is allowed only those trades for which the maximum loss for any possible outcome does not exceed the budget.
The main contribution of this paper is a rich, geometric characterization of the impact of budget constraints. Price vectors, outcomes and trader beliefs are embedded in the space of the same dimension as the number of securities. Outcome vectors enumerate security payoffs; belief vectors enumerate the traders' expectations of payoffs. We consider, for a fixed belief, the locus of the resulting price vectors of an optimal trade as a function of the budget. We show that the price vector moves in the convex hull of the belief and the set of tight outcomes, in a direction that is perpendicular to the set of tight outcomes. We also introduce the concept of budget additivity: two agents with budgets B and B and the same beliefs have the same power to move the prices as a single agent with the same belief and budget B+B . An absence of budget additivity points to an inefficiency in incorporating information from the traders. We show that budget additivity is a non-trivial property by giving examples of market makers that do not satisfy budget additivity. We give a set of sufficient conditions on the market maker and the set of securities offered which guarantee budget additivity. Further, for two of the most commonly used market makers (the quadratic and logarithmic market scoring rules), we show sufficient conditions on the set of securities that guarantee budget additivity.
Of greatest practical interest is the application of our results to markets consisting of several independent questions, with each question priced according to a separate logarithmic market scoring rule. This setup constitutes a de facto industry standard, and the companies that use (or used) it include Inkling Markets, 2 Consensus Point, 3 Microsoft and Yahoo! [17] . Our Theorems 5.6 and 5.8 show that these markets are budget additive.
Previously, Fortnow and Sami [8] considered a different question: do budget-constrained bidders always move the market prices in the direction of their beliefs? They showed that the answer to this is no: there always exist market prices, beliefs and budgets such that the direction of price movement is not towards the belief. We give a richer char-2 inklingmarkets.com 3 www.consensuspoint.com acterization of how the market prices move in the presence of budget constraints, by charting the path the prices take with increasing budgets. The impossibility result of Fortnow and Sami [8] can be easily derived from our characterization (see Appendix D). 4 A designer of a prediction market has a lot of freedom but little guidance, and our results can be used both descriptively and prescriptively. As a descriptive tool, our results enable us to analyze commonly used market makers and understand if budget constraints hamper information aggregation in these markets. As a prescriptive tool, our results can be used to construct markets that are budget additive. In particular, we speculate that budget additivity simplifies the choice of the liquidity parameter in the markets, because it allows considering trader budgets in aggregate.
Proof overview and techniques. Our analysis borrows heavily from techniques in convex analysis and builds on the notion of Bregman divergence. We use the special case of Euclidean distance (corresponding to a quadratic market scoring rule) to form our geometric intuition which we then extend to arbitrary Bregman divergences. For the sake of an example, consider a complete market over a finite set of outcomes, where the market prices lie in a simplex, exactly coinciding with the set of probability distributions over outcomes. Every possible outcome imposes a constraint on the set of prices to which a trader can move the market, because the trader is not allowed to exceed the budget if that outcome occurs. The prices satisfying this constraint form a ball with the outcome at its center. The set of feasible prices to which the trader can move the market is therefore the intersection of these balls (see Figure 1 ).
The key structural result we obtain is the chart of the price movement. Suppose that there is an infinite sequence of agents with infinitesimally small budgets all with the same belief. What is the path along which the prices move from some initial values? This is determined by the agents' belief and the set of budget constraints that are tight at any point, corresponding to the highest risk outcomes (outcomes with the highest potential loss). We show that the price vector can always be written as a convex combination of these highest risk outcomes and the agents' belief. Further, the market prices move in a direction that is perpendicular to the affine space of these outcomes.
The agents' belief partitions the simplex interior into regions, where each region is the interior of the convex hull of the agent belief and a particular subset of outcomes. For a region that is full-dimensional, every interior point can be uniquely written as a convex combination of the agent belief and all except one outcome. Assume that the current price vector lies in this region. In the anticipation of the further development, we call this outcome profitable and others risky. Motivated by the characterization above, we • -current state, × -belief, -optimal action for a given belief and budget. Three circles bound the allowed final states for budget 0.1. We plot optimal actions for two different beliefs. Right: A path from the initial state to the belief, consisting of optimal actions for increasing budgets.
move perpendicular to the risky outcomes in the direction towards the agents' belief. As a result, we increase the risk of risky outcomes (equally for all outcomes), while getting closer to the one profitable outcome (and hence increasing its profit). The characterization then guarantees that the prices along this path are indeed those chosen by traders at increasing budgets, because the risky outcomes yield tight constraints.
We would like the same to be true for the lower dimensional regions as well; that is, for the set of tight constraints to be exactly the corresponding set of outcomes defining the convex hull. In fact, this property is sufficient to guarantee budget additivity. The markets for which the tight constraints are exactly the minimal set of outcomes that define the region the price lies in are budget additive. (We conjecture that the converse holds as well.) The entire path is then as follows: w.l.o.g. you start at a full-dimensional region, move along the perpendicular until you hit the boundary of the region and you are in a lower-dimensional region, move along the perpendicular in this lower-dimensional region, and so on until you reach the belief (see Figure 1 ). The set of tight constraints is monotonically decreasing. We show that such markets are characterized by a certain acute angles assumption on the set of possible outcomes. Loosely speaking, this assumption guarantees that outcomes outside the minimal set behave as the profitable outcome in the above example.
Other related work. There is a rich literature on scoring rules and prediction markets. 
PRELIMINARIES
Securities and payoffs. Consider a probability space with a finite set of outcomes Ω ⊆ R n . A security is a financial instrument whose payoff depends on the realization of an outcome in Ω. In other words, the payoff of a security is a random variable of the probability space. We consider trading with n securities corresponding to n coordinates of the outcomes ω ∈ Ω. A security can be traded before the realization is observed with the intention that the price of a security serves as a prediction for the expected payoff, i.e., the expected value of the corresponding coordinate.
Cost function, prices and utilities. An automated market maker always offers to trade securities, for the right price. In fact the price vector is the current prediction of the market maker for the expectation of ω. A cost function based market maker is based on a differentiable convex cost function, C : R n → R. It is a scalar function of an n-dimensional vector q ∈ R n representing the number of outstanding shares 5 for our n securities. We also refer to q as the state of the market.
The vector of instantaneous prices of the securities is simply the gradient of C at q, denoted by p(q) := ∇C(q). The prices of securities change continuously as the securities are traded, so it is useful to consider the cost of trading a given quantity of securities. The cost of buying δ ∈ R n units of securities (where a negative value corresponds to selling) is determined by the path integral
, where π is any smooth curve from q to q + δ.
When the outcome ω is realized, the vector of δ units of securities pays off an amount of δ · ω. Thus, the realized utility of a trader whose trade δ moved the market state from q to q = q + δ is
We make a standard assumption that the maximum achievable utility, which is also the maximum loss of the market maker, is bounded by a finite constant (in Section 4, we introduce a standard approach to check this easily). Let M be the convex hull of the payoff vectors, M := conv(Ω). It is easy to see that M contains exactly the vectors µ ∈ R n which can be realized as expected payoffs E[ω] for some probability distribution over Ω. For a trader who believes that E[ω] = µ, the expected utility takes form
Throughout, we consider a single myopic trader who trades as if he were the last to trade. A key property satisfied by expected utility is path independence: for any q,q, q ∈ R n , U (q , µ;q) + U (q, µ; q) = U (q , µ; q), that is, riskneutral traders have no incentive to split their trades. For a risk-neutral trader, q ∈ R n is an optimal action if and only if µ = ∇C(q ) = p(q ) (this follows from the first-order optimality conditions). In other words, the trader is incentivized to move the market to the prices corresponding to his belief as long as such prices exist. In general, there may be multiple states yielding the same prices, so the inverse map p −1 (µ) returns a set, which can be empty if no state yields the price vector µ.
Commonly-used cost functions include the quadratic cost, logarithmic market-scoring rule (LMSR) and the logpartition function. They are described in detail in Appendix A. The quadratic cost is defined by C(q) = and p(q) = q. Log-partition function is defined as C(q) = ln( ω∈Ω e q·ω ). It subsumes LMSR as a special case for the complete market with the outcomes corresponding to vertices of the simplex. The prices under log-partition cost correspond to the expected value of ω under the distribution
Budget constraints. Trading in prediction markets needs an investment of capital. It is possible that an agent loses money on the trade, in particular U (q , ω; q) could be negative for some ω. One restriction on how an agent trades could be that he is unable to sustain a big loss, due to a budget constraint. We consider the notion of natural budget constraint defined by Fortnow and Sami [8] which states that the loss of the agent is at most his budget, for all ω ∈ Ω. Given a starting market state q 0 and a budget of B ≥ 0, a trader with the belief µ ∈ M then solves the problem:
(2.1)
For quadratic costs, each constraint corresponds to a sphere with one of the outcomes at its center, so the feasible region is an intersection of these spheres. We will later see that this generalizes to an intersection of balls w.r.t. a Bregman divergence for general costs.
In general, there may be multiple q optimizing this objective. In the following definition we introduce notation for various solution sets we will be analyzing. The belief µ is fixed throughout most of the discussion, so we suppress the dependence on µ. Definition 2.1 (Solution sets). LetQ(B; q 0 ) denote the set of solutions of Convex Program (2.1) for a fixed initial state and budget. LetQ(q 0 ) = B≥0Q (B; q 0 ) denote the set of solutions of (2.1) for a fixed initial state across all budgets. LetQ(ν; q 0 ) = p −1 (ν) ∩Q(q 0 ) denote the set of states q that optimize (2.1) for some budget B and yield the market price vector ν.
The next theorem shows that solutions for a fixed initial state and budget always yield the same price vector. It is proved in Appendix B. Theorem 2.2. If q, q ∈Q(B; q 0 ), then p(q) = p(q ).
Geometry of linear spaces. We finish this section by reviewing a few standard geometric definitions we use in next sections. Let X ⊆ R n . Then aff(X) denotes the affine hull of the set X (i.e., the smallest affine space including X). We write X ⊥ to denote the orthogonal complement of X: X ⊥ := {u ∈ R n : u · (x − x) = 0 for all x, x ∈ X}. We use the convention ∅ ⊥ = R n . A set K ∈ R n is called a cone if it is closed under multiplication by positive scalars. If a cone is convex, it is also closed under addition. Since Ω is finite, the realizable set M = conv(Ω) is a polytope. Its boundary can be decomposed into faces. More precisely, X ⊆ Ω, X = ∅, forms a face of M if X is the set of maximizers over Ω of some linear function. 6 We also view X = ∅ as a face of M. With this definition, for any two faces X, X , also their intersection X ∩ X is a face.
CHARACTERIZING SOLUTION SETS
We start with the optimality (KKT) conditions for the Convex Program (2.1), as characterized by the next lemma. One of the key conditions is that the solution prices must be in the convex hull of the belief µ and all the ω's for which the budget constraints are tight. The set of tight constraints is always a face of the polytope M. We allow an empty set as a face, which corresponds to the case when none of the constraints are tight and the solution prices coincide with µ. The proof follows by analyzing KKT conditions (see Appendix C of the full version for details).
Lemma 3.1 (KKT lemma). Let q 0 ∈ R n . Then q ∈ Q(B; q 0 ) if and only if there exists a face X ⊆ Ω such that the following conditions hold:
where conditions (a) and (b) hold vacuously for X = ∅.
The condition (a) requires that q − q 0 be orthogonal to the active set X. The set of points satisfying conditions (a) and (c) will be called the Bregman perpendicular and will be defined in the next section. The condition (b) is a statement about acuteness of the angle between q − q 0 (the perpendicular) and the outcomes. It will be the basis of our acute angles assumption. The condition (d) just states how the budget is related to the active set X.
Witness cones and minimal faces. We now introduce some notation to help us state reinterpretations of the conditions in Lemma 3.1. First of all, given a face X, what is the set of q's that satisfy conditions (a) and (b)? This is captured by what we call the witness cone.
Definition 3.2. The witness cone for a face X ⊆ Ω is defined as K(X) := {u ∈ R n : u · (ω − x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X, ω ∈ Ω} if X = ∅, and K(X) := R n if X = ∅.
The following two properties of witness cones are immediate from the definition:
A state q satisfies conditions (a) and (b) for a given face X if and only if q −q 0 ∈ K(X). Now given a state q, consider the set of faces that could satisfy condition (c). This set has a useful structure, namely that there is a unique minimal face (proved in Appendix C of the full version).
Definition 3.3. Given a price vector ν ∈ M, the minimal face for ν is the minimal face X (under inclusion) s.t. ν ∈ conv(X ∪ {µ}). The minimal face for ν is denoted as X ν .
With the existence of a minimal face and the antimonotonicity of the witness sets, it follows that if q and X satisfy conditions (a), (b) and (c), then so do q and X p(q) . Thus we obtain the following version of Lemma 3.1 (proved in Appendix C of the full version). 
Using Theorem 3.4, we immediately obtain a characterization of when a price vector ν could be the price vector of an optimal solution to (2.1).
In particular, ν is the price vector of an optimal solution to (2.1) if and only if p
We now study an example using the above characterization. More examples can be found in Appendix E of the full version.
Example 3.6 (Quadratic cost on an obtuse triangle; see Example E.2 in the full version for details). Consider the following outcome space, belief, and the sequence of market states (depicted in Figure 2 ):
Using the KKT lemma, we can show for j = 1, 2, 3, that q j = ν j is an optimal action at q j−1 = ν j−1 under belief µ, with the corresponding budgets as: The above table also shows that the budget B 0µ = 1.215 suffices to move directly from q 0 to q µ . However, note that the sum B 01 + B 12 + B 23 = 1.215 = B 0µ , but ν 3 = µ, i.e., after the sequence of optimal actions with budgets B 01 , B 12 , and B 23 , the market is still not at the belief shared by all agents, even though with the budget B 0µ , it would have reached it.
Budget additivity. The above example suggests that multiple traders with the same belief may have less power in moving the market state towards their belief compared to a single trader with the same belief and the combined budget. Since prediction markets aim to efficiently aggregate information from agents, it is natural to ask under what conditions multiple traders with the same beliefs do have a combined impact equal to a single trader with the combined budget.
Next, we formally define this property as budget additivity. We then define the Euclidean version of the acute angles condition that we show is sufficient for budget additivity.
Definition 3.7 (Budget additivity). We say that a prediction market is budget additive on M ⊆ M if for all beliefs µ ∈ M and all initial states q 0 ∈ p −1 (M ) the following holds: For any budgets B, B ≥ 0 and any sequence of solutions q ∈Q(B; q 0 ) and q ∈Q(B ; q), we have p(q), p(q ) ∈ M and q ∈Q(B + B ; q 0 ).
In other words, the market is budget additive if the sequence of optimal actions of two agents with the same be- lief and budgets B and B is also an optimal action of a single agent with the same belief and a larger budget B + B . Thanks to Theorem 2.2 we then also obtain that the price vector following the sequence of optimal actions by the two agents is the same as the price vector after the optimal action by an agent with the combined budget (all with the same beliefs).
We now state the acute angles assumption for the Euclidean case, to give an intuition. Our acute angles assumption (Definition 5.1) is a generalization of this. We later show that the acute angles property is sufficient for budget additivity (Theorem 5.2). Definition 3.8. We say that the Euclidean acute angles hold for a face X, if the angle between any pointν ∈ M, its projection on the affine hull of X and any payoff ω ∈ Ω is non-obtuse (the angle is measured at the projection).
Based on the above example, one may hypothesize that the obtuse angles are to blame for the lack of budget additivity.
In the following sections we will show that this is indeed the case, but that the notion of obtuse/acute angles depends on the Bregman divergence. In particular, the above example would have been budget-additive if we used the logpartition cost instead of the quadratic cost.
BREGMAN DIVERGENCE AND PERPENDICULARS
We will see next that the utility function U can be written as the difference of two terms measuring the distance between the belief and the market state before and after the trade. This distance measure is the mixed Bregman divergence. 7 To define the Bregman divergence, first let
Since C * is a supremum of linear functions, it is convex lower semicontinuous. Up to a constant, it characterizes the maximum achievable utility on an outcome ω for a fixed initial state q 7 Our notion of Bregman divergence is more general than typically assumed in the literature.
as sup q ∈R n U (q , ω; q) = C * (ω)+ C(q)−q·ω . The term in the brackets is always finite, but C * might be positive infinite. We make a standard assumption that C * (ω) < ∞ for all ω ∈ Ω, i.e., that the maximum achievable utility, which is also the maximum loss of the market maker, is bounded by a finite constant. By convexity, this implies that
From the convexity of C and C * and the definition of C * , it is clear that: (i) D is convex and lower semi-continuous in each argument separately; (ii) D is non-negative; and (iii) D is zero iff p(q) = ∇C(q) = µ. By the bounded loss assumption, Bregman divergence is finite on µ ∈ M. For µ ∈ M, we can write
Thus, maximizing the expected utility is the same as minimizing the Bregman divergence between the state q and the belief µ. From Eq. (4.1) it is also clear that each con-
and the geometric interpretation is that the agent seeks to find the state closest to his belief, within the intersection of Bregman balls
For the quadratic cost, we have C
2 , i.e., the Bregman divergence coincides with the Euclidean distance squared. For logpartition cost, we have C * (ν) = ω∈Ω P ν (ω) ln P ν (ω) where P ν is the distribution maximizing entropy among P satisfying E P [ω] = ν. The Bregman divergence is the KLdivergence between P q and P ν : D(q, ν) = KL(P ν P q ).
Convex analysis.
We overview a few standard definitions and results from convex analysis. For X ⊆ R n , we write ri X for the relative interior of X (i.e., the interior relative to the affine hull). For a convex function
, we define its effective domain as dom F := {u ∈ R n : F (u) < ∞} (i.e., the set of points where it is finite). The subdifferential of F at a point u is the set ∂F (u) := {v ∈ R n :
We say that F is subdifferentiable at u if ∂F (u) = ∅. A standard result of convex analysis states that F is always subdifferentiable on a superset of ri dom F . If F is not only convex, but also lower semi-continuous, then ∂F and ∂F * are inverses in the sense that v ∈ ∂F (u) iff u ∈ ∂F * (v). If F is differentiable everywhere on R n , then F * is strictly convex on ri dom F * .
Let im p := {p(q) : q ∈ R n } denote the set of prices that can be expressed by market states. The implications for our setting are that: (i) C * is subdifferentiable on im p;
for all ν ∈ R n ; (iii) all beliefs in ri dom C * can be expressed by some state q; (iv) C * is strictly convex on ri dom C * , and similarly D(q, ν) is strictly convex on ri dom C * as a function of the second argument.
Assumptions on the cost function.
• Convexity and differentiability on R n . C is convex and differentiable on R n .
The first two assumptions are standard. The third assumption is a regularity condition that we require in our results. Here we briefly discuss how it compares with the finite loss assumption. While the two assumptions look similar, neither of them implies the other. For example, if dom C * is an n-dimensional simplex and M is one of its lower dimensional faces, which are lower dimensional simplices, then the finite loss assumption holds, but the inclusion assumption does not. Similarly, for n = 1 and M = [0, 1], the inclusion assumption is satisfied by the conjugate C * (ν) = 1/ν + 1/(1 − ν) on ν ∈ (0, 1) and C * (ν) = ∞ on ν ∈ (0, 1), but this conjugate does not satisfy the finite loss assumption.
We do not view the inclusion assumption as very restrictive, since it is satisfied by many common cost functions. For instance, it always holds when C is constructed as in [1] , because their construction guarantees dom C * = M. However, the inclusion assumption might not hold for cost functions that allow arbitrage (e.g., [6]).
Our main result relies on strict convexity of C * on ri dom C * , so some of our statements will require that the market prices and beliefs lie in that set. The inclusion assumption above guarantees that at the minimum ri M ⊆ ri dom C * , but the boundary of M is not necessarily included. To allow some generality beyond ri M, we define the setM
In either case we obtain thatM ⊆ ri dom C * ⊆ im p, i.e., beliefs inM can be expressed by some state q. For the quadratic cost,M = M. For the log-partition cost, M = ri M.
Perpendiculars. We now define the notion of a Bregman perpendicular to an affine space. This is a constructive definition. It plays a central role in the definition of the acute angles assumption, and also in the proof of the main result (Theorem 5.2). We will see that the set of optimal price vectors for different budgets is a sequence of Bregman perpendiculars. Naturally, perpendiculars are closely related to the conditions in Lemma 3.1; in particular to the set of q's that satisfy conditions (a) and (c) for a given face X.
For quadratic costs, Bregman perpendiculars coincide with the usual Euclidean perpendiculars. Consider an affine space and a point not in it. A projection of the point onto the space is the point in the space that is closest in Euclidean distance to the given point. Now consider moving this affine space towards the projected point. The locus of the projection as we move the space is the perpendicular to the space through the given point. We extend this definition to arbitrary Bregman divergences by defining the projection using the corresponding Bregman divergence.
A Bregman perpendicular is determined by three geometric objects within the affine hull aff(dom C * ). The first of these is an affine space, say A 0 ⊆ aff(dom C * ). The second is a point a 1 ∈ aff(dom C * )\A 0 . The affine space A = aff(A 0 ∪ {a 1 }) ⊆ aff(dom C * ) will be the ambient space that will contain the perpendicular. Define parallel spaces to A 0 in A, for an arbitrary point a 0 ∈ A 0 , as
Note that the definition of A λ is independent of the choice of a 0 . The third geometric object is a market state q ∈ R n such that p(q) ∈ A. For technical reasons, we will define a perpendicular at q rather than a more natural notion, which would be at p(q). Our reason for switching into q-space is that inner products, defining optimality of the Bregman projection, are between elements of q-space and ν-space (the two spaces coincide for Euclidean distance). For all λ ∈ R define a Bregman projection of q onto A λ as
Since D(q, ν) is bounded from below and lower semicontinuous, the minimum is always attained (but it may be equal to ∞). If it is attained at more than one point, we choose an arbitrary minimizer. Whenever we can choose ν λ ∈ ri dom C * , this ν λ must be the unique minimizer by strict convexity of D(q, ·) on ri dom C * , and the minimum is finite. We use these ν λ 's to define the perpendicular: Definition 4.1. Given A 0 , a 1 and q as above, the a 1 -perpendicular to A 0 at q is a map γ : λ → ν λ defined over λ ∈ Λ := {λ ∈ R : ν λ ∈ ri dom C * }. We call Λ the domain of the perpendicular. We define a total order on
In Appendix F.2 of the full version, we show that perpendiculars are continuous maps. The name perpendicular is justified by the following proposition which matches our Euclidean intuition that the perpendiculars can be obtained by intersecting the ambient space A with the affine space which passes through q and is orthogonal to A 0 . It also shows that the perpendicular corresponds to the set of prices that satisfy conditions (a) and (c) with the convex hull relaxed to the affine hull (when A 0 is the affine hull of face X, point a 1 coincides with µ and q is the initial state). Recall that for an arbitrary set X ⊆ R n , its orthogonal complement is defined as
Proposition 4.2. Let γ be the a 1 -perpendicular to A 0 at q, and let A = aff(A 0 ∪ {a 1 }). The following two statements are equivalent for any ν ∈ R n : 
BUDGET ADDITIVITY
We now state the acute angles property which links the Bregman perpendicular and Corollary 3.5, and is sufficient for budget additivity.
Definition 5.1. We say that the acute angles hold for a face X, if for every µ-perpendicular γ to X at q, such that µ ∈ M and q ∈ p −1 (M), the following holds:
The motivation for the name "acute angles" comes from the Euclidean distance case, where this assumption is equivalent to Definition 3.8 (see Proposition G.1 in the full version). The acute angles property is non-trivial and we have seen that without this property, budget additivity need not hold; we conjecture that it is also a necessary condition. After stating the main theorem, we analyze in more detail when the acute angles are satisfied by the quadratic and log-partition costs.
We now state the main result, that the acute angles are sufficient for budget additivity:
Theorem 5.2 (Sufficient conditions for budget additivity). If acute angles hold for every face X ⊆ Ω, then the prediction market is budget additive onM.
Sufficient conditions for acute angles. We next give the sufficient conditions when the acute angles hold for the quadratic and log-partition cost functions. We also show that the acute angles hold for all one-dimensional outcome spaces, and that they are preserved by taking direct sums of markets. Recall that a set K ∈ R n is called a cone if it is closed under multiplication by positive scalars. A cone is called acute, if x · y ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ K. An affine cone with the vertex a 0 is a set K of the form a 0 + K where K is a cone.
Theorem 5.3 (Sufficient condition for quadratic cost). Let X be a face and A be the affine space a 0 + X ⊥ for an arbitrary a 0 ∈ aff(X). Acute angles hold for the face X and the quadratic cost if and only if the projection of Ω (or, equivalently, M) on A is contained in an affine acute cone with the vertex a 0 .
Corollary 5.4. Acute angles hold for the quadratic cost and a hypercube Ω = {0, 1}
n .
Corollary 5.5. Acute angles hold for the quadratic cost and simplex Ω = {e i : i ∈ [n]} where [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and e i is the i-th vector of the standard basis in R n .
Theorem 5.6 (Log-partition over affinely independent outcomes). If the set Ω is affinely independent then acute angles assumption is satisfied for the log-partition cost.
Theorem 5.7 (One-dimensional outcome spaces). Acute angles hold for any cost function if M is a line segment.
Let Ω 1 ⊆ R n1 and Ω 2 ⊆ R n2 be outcome spaces with costs C 1 and C 2 . We define the direct sum of Ω 1 and Ω 2 to be the outcome space Ω = Ω 1 × Ω 2 with the cost C :
Theorem 5.8 (Acute angles for direct sums). If acute angles hold for Ω 1 with cost C 1 , and Ω 2 with cost C 2 , then they also hold for their direct sum.
As a direct consequence of this theorem, we obtain that the log-partition cost function satisfies the acute angles assumption on a hypercube. More generally, any direct sum of costs on line segments satisfies the acute angles. This means that all cost-based prediction markets consisting of independent binary questions are budget additive, regardless of costs used to price individual questions.
As mentioned in the introduction, a vast number of deployed cost-based prediction markets consists of independent questions (not necessarily binary), each priced according to an LMSR (i.e., a log-partition cost on a simplex). Theorems 5.6 and 5.8 imply that this industry standard is budget additive.
Proof of Theorem 5.2
In this section we sketch the proof of Theorem 5.2 (for a complete proof see Appendix H of the full version). We proceed in several steps. Let ν 0 = p(q 0 ). Assuming acute angles, we begin by constructing an oriented curve L joining ν 0 with µ, by sequentially choosing portions of perpendiculars for monotonically decreasing active sets. We then show that budget additivity holds for any solutions with prices in L, and finally show that the curve L is the locus of the optimal prices of solutionsQ(q 0 ), as well as optimal prices of solutionsQ(q) for any q ∈Q(q 0 ).
Part 1: Construction of the solution path L. In this part, we construct:
• a sequence of prices ν 0 , ν 1 , . . . , ν k with ν 0 = p(q 0 ) and ν k = µ • a sequence of oriented curves 0 , . . . , k−1 where each
such that the following minimality property holds: X i is the minimal face for all ν ∈ (im i )\{ν i+1 } for i ≤ k − 1, and X k is the minimal face for ν k .
• a sequence of states q 1 , . . . , q k−1 such that
The curves i will be referred to as segments. The curve obtained by concatenating the segments 0 through k−1 will be called the solution path and denoted L. In the special case that ν 0 = µ, we have k = 0, X 0 = ∅ and L is a degenerate curve with im L = {µ}.
If ν 0 = µ, we construct the sequence of segments iteratively. Let X 0 = ∅ be the minimal face such that ν 0 ∈ conv(X 0 ∪ {µ}). By the minimality, µ ∈ aff(X 0 ). Let γ be the µ-perpendicular to aff(X 0 ) at q 0 . The curve γ passes through ν 0 and eventually reaches the boundary of conv(X 0 ∪ {µ}) at some ν 1 by continuity of γ (see Theorem F.3). Let segment 0 be the portion of γ going from ν 0 to ν 1 .
This construction gives us the first segment 0 . There are two possibilities:
1. ν 1 = µ; in this case we are done; 2. ν 1 lies on a lower-dimensional face of conv(X 0 ∪ {µ}); in this case, we pick some
, which can be done by the acute angles assumption, and use the above construction again, starting with q 1 , and obtaining a new set X 1 ⊂ X 0 and a new segment 1 ; and iterate.
The above process eventually ends, because with each iteration, the size of the active set decreases. This construction yields monotonicity of X i and the minimality property.
The above construction yields a specific sequence of
and that the construction of L is independent of the choice of q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q k−1 .
Part 2: Budget additivity for points on L. Let ν, ν ∈ im L such that ν ν . Let q ∈Q(ν; q 0 ) and q ∈Q(ν ; q) such that q ∈Q(B; q 0 ) and q ∈Q(B ; q). In this part we show that q ∈Q(B + B ; q 0 ).
First, consider the case that ν = µ. To see that q ∈ Q(B + B ; q 0 ), first note that the constraints of Convex Program (2.1) hold, because U (q , ω; q 0 ) = U (q , ω; q) + U (q, ω; q 0 ) ≥ −B − B for all ω by path independence of the utility function. As noted in the introduction, in the absence of constraints, the utility U (q, µ; q 0 ) is maximized at anyq with p(q) = µ. Thus, q is a global maximizer of the utility and satisfies the constraints, so q ∈Q(B +
By anti-monotonicity of witness cones, K(X j ) ⊇ K(X i ) and hence, q ∈ [q 0 + K(X j )], yielding q ∈Q(ν ; q 0 ).
We now argue that the budgets add up. Let x ∈ X j ⊆ X i . By Lemma 3.1, we obtain that q ∈Q(B; q 0 ) for B = −U (q, x; q 0 ), and q ∈Q(B ; q) for B = −U (q , x; q), and finally q ∈Q(B; q 0 ) forB = −U (q , x; q 0 ). However, by path independence of the utility function 
Part 4: Proof of the theorem. Let B, B ≥ 0 and q ∈ Q(B; q 0 ) and q ∈Q(B ; q). From Parts 3 and 3', we know that q ∈Q(ν; q 0 ) and q ∈Q(ν ; q) for some ν, ν ∈ im L such that ν ν . By Part 2, we therefore obtain that q ∈ Q(B + B ; q 0 ), proving the theorem.
[2] Alina Beygelzimer, John Langford, and David M.
Pennock. 
] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. In this case M is the simplex in R n and beliefs µ are in one-toone correspondence with probability distributions over Ω. The LMSR cost function is
where q[i] denotes the i-th coordinate of q. The price vector is
For µ ∈ M, the expected utility function takes form
is the KLdivergence. KL-divergence is not symmetric, but it is nonnegative, and zero only if the arguments are equal. Thus, the expected utility is clearly maximized if and only if µ = p(q ).
Convex conjugate and Bregman divergence: C * (ν) = ∞ if ν is not a probability measure on Ω, and
otherwise, with the convention 0 ln 0 = 0. The Bregman divergence is D(q, ν) = KL(ν p(q)). Example A.3 (Log-partition cost). Next example is the log-partition function, which is applicable to arbitrary outcome sets Ω and which generalizes LMSR:
Let P q be the probability measure over Ω defined by
The prices then correspond to expected values of ω under P q :
For µ ∈ M, let P µ denote the distribution of maximum entropy among P with E P [ω] = µ (this distribution is unique and always exists). Note that we are overloading notation on P q and P ν and use the "type" of the subscript to indicate which probability distribution we have in mind. The expected utility function can be written as
A standard duality result shows that the infimum of KL(P µ P q ) over the set {P q : q ∈ R n } is zero. If there exists q attaining this minimum, we must have P µ = P q and thus µ = p(q ). We argue that the converse is true as well. Let q , q be such that P q = P µ and p(q ) = p(q ) = µ. Then by convexity of C, we have
i.e., P q = P q = P µ . Hence, for any q ∈ R n , P q is exactly the distribution of maximum entropy among those P that satisfy E P [ω] = p(q). In other words, P p(q) = P q .
Convex conjugate and Bregman divergence: C * (ν) = ∞ if there is no distribution P on Ω such that E P [ω] = ν, and C * (ν) = ω∈Ω P ν (ω) ln P ν (ω) otherwise. The Bregman divergence D(q, ν) = KL(P ν P q ) = KL(P ν P p(q) ).
B PROOF OF THEOREM 2.2
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Throughout this proof we use concepts of convex conjugacy and Bregman divergence introduced in Section 4. Let B ≥ 0 and B := {q : U (q, ω; q 0 ) ≥ −B for all ω ∈ Ω} be the set of states satisfying the constraints of Convex Program (2.1). Using the definition of utility function, we can rewrite Convex Program (2.1) as
where I B (·) is the convex indicator function, equal to 0 on the set B and ∞ outside it. Since the cost function C is convex on R n , and B is closed, convex and non-empty, Fenchel's Duality Theorem [18, Theorem 31.1] implies that the supremum of the above objective equals the following minimum
and this minimum is attained at someν ∈ R n . Now, let q ∈Q(B; q 0 ) be a solution of Eq. (B.1). By Fenchel's Duality, the gap between the objectives of Eq. (B.2) and Eq. (B.1) atν andq must be zero:
The term in the brackets is non-negative from the definition of the convex conjugate. Since D(q,ν) is also nonnegative, we obtain that it must be zero, i.e., p(q) =ν. Since this reasoning is independent of the choiceq ∈ Q(B; q 0 ), the theorem follows.
C OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS AND THE MINIMAL FACE
This appendix discusses arbitrage-free initialization, provides proofs of optimality conditions (Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.4), and shows that minimal faces are well defined.
C.1 Arbitrage-free initialization
Throughout the paper we assume that the initial state q 0 is arbitrage-free in the sense that a trader with no budget prefers to stay in q 0 :
Definition C.1. We say that the initial state q 0 is arbitragefree with respect to µ ∈ M if q 0 is an optimal state at budget zero, i.e., q 0 ∈Q(0; q 0 ).
This corresponds to the assumption that a trader cannot extract a positive expected profit without risking some capital. Below we show that the condition is easily ensured for both the log-partition and quadratic cost.
The assumption of arbitrage-free initialization was added after the paper was published in the Proceedings of the 31st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 2015. For the sake of consistency with the published version, we have only made corrections in Appendix. Without arbitrage-free initialization, Lemma 3.1 and its corollaries fail to hold for B = 0. The main text requires the following four corrections: Below we show that regardless of q 0 , any q ∈Q(q 0 ) is arbitrage-free. This property is useful in proving our main result (Theorem 5.2). We also derive necessary and sufficient conditions for arbitrage-free initialization. In particular, we show that any q 0 is arbitrage-free for the logpartition cost, and any q 0 with p(q 0 ) ∈ M is arbitrage-free for the quadratic cost.
Proposition C.2. Any q ∈Q(q 0 ) is arbitrage-free for any q 0 ∈ R n .
Proof. Let q ∈Q(B; q 0 ) for some B ≥ 0 and let q ∈ Q(0; q). We will use path independence to show that also q ∈Q(0; q). To begin, note that the budget constraints satisfied by q and q are
By path independence, we therefore have, for all ω ∈ Ω,
so q satisfies the budget constraints for B at the initial state q 0 . Since q is optimal for the budget B and the initial state q 0 , we must have
Path independence then gives
U (q , µ; q) = U (q , µ; q 0 )−U (q, µ; q 0 ) ≤ 0 = U (q, µ; q) .
Since q ∈Q(0; q) and q is a feasible action for the budget zero and the initial state q, we must have U (q , µ; q) = 0 = U (q, µ; q) and thus q ∈Q(0; q).
Proof. For a contradiction, assume p(q 0 ) ∈ M. We will show that there exists a state q such that U (q , ν; q 0 ) ≥ ε for all ν ∈ M and some ε > 0. This will imply that the budget constraints for B = 0 are satisfied for q and also that U (q , µ; q 0 ) ≥ ε. This contradicts the optimality of q 0 because U (q 0 , µ; q 0 ) = 0.
To proceed, consider the optimization
where we use Sion's minimax theorem in Eq. (C.1), the definition of conjugate in Eq. (C.2), and denote the minimizer of Eq. (C.3) asν in Eq. (C.4). By assumption, p(q 0 ) ∈ M and thus p(q 0 ) =ν. This implies that D(q 0 ,ν) > 0, so the value of the initial supremum is greater than zero. Therefore, there must exist q such that min ν∈M U (q , ν; q 0 ) =: ε > 0, yielding the desired contradiction.
While p(q 0 ) ∈ M is a necessary condition for arbitragefree initialization, it is not sufficient. For example, consider n = 1, M = [0, 1], and the cost function C(q) = max{0, q 2 /2}. Here, q 0 = −1 is not arbitrage-free for any µ ∈ (0, 1], even though p(q 0 ) = 0 ∈ M. We next present a technical lemma followed by two sufficient conditions. Lemma C.4. Let q 0 be such that p(q 0 ) ∈ M and let q ∈Q(0; q 0 ). Then p(q) = p(q 0 ), and for any decomposition of p(q 0 ) into a convex combination over ω, i.e., for any weights c ω ≥ 0 such that p(q 0 ) = ω∈Ω c ω ω and ω∈Ω c ω = 1, we have c ω U (q, ω; q 0 ) = 0 for all ω.
Proof. Budget constraints on q ∈Q(0; q 0 ) imply that
For a given set of weights c ω write
Since Bregman divergence is non-negative, we obtain that D(q, p(q 0 )) = 0 and thus p(q) = p(q 0 ). From Eq. (C.6), we then also obtain that each of the terms c ω U (q, ω; q 0 ) must equal zero, because c ω ≥ 0 and utilities are nonnegative by Eq. (C.5).
Proposition C.5. The state q 0 is arbitrage-free if either of the following conditions holds:
Proof.
Part (a). Let q ∈Q(0; q 0 ). It suffices to show that U (q, µ; q 0 ) ≤ U (q 0 , µ; q 0 ) = 0. To begin, note that since p(q 0 ) ∈ ri M, we can write p(q 0 ) as a positive convex combination of ω ∈ Ω, i.e., p(q 0 ) = ω∈Ω c ω ω where c ω > 0 and ω∈Ω c ω = 1. By Lemma C.4, we obtain that c ω U (q, ω; q 0 ) = 0 for all ω and hence U (q, ω; q 0 ) = 0 for all ω. Since µ is a convex combination of ω, the linearity of utility in the second argument yields U (q, µ; q 0 ) = 0.
Part (b).
We again appeal to Lemma C.4. Let q ∈ Q(0; q 0 ). Then by Lemma C.4, we have that p(q) = p(q 0 ), and the strict convexity of C yields q = q 0 .
Part (a) implies that every q 0 ∈ R n is arbitrage-free for the log-partition cost. Part (b) implies that every q 0 such that p(q 0 ) ∈ M is arbitrage-free for the quadratic cost.
C.2 Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.4
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We prove the revised version of the lemma with the additional assumption that q 0 is arbitragefree (see Appendix C.1). First consider B = 0 and assume q ∈Q(B; q 0 ). Since q 0 is arbitrage-free, we have p(q 0 ) ∈ M, so it can be written as a convex combination of ω ∈ Ω, say p(q 0 ) = ω c ω ω. By Lemma C.4 we therefore obtain that each of the terms c ω U (q, ω; q 0 ) must equal zero. Thus, whenever c ω > 0, we necessarily have U (q, ω; q 0 ) = 0. Let S := {ω ∈ Ω : c ω > 0}. Note that for any x, x ∈ S we have (q −q 0 )·(x −x) = U (q, x ; q 0 )−U (q, x; q 0 ) = 0. Since S is non-empty, we can pick an arbitrary s ∈ S and define X := {ω ∈ Ω : (q − q 0 ) · (ω − s) = 0}. We next argue that X satisfies conditions (a)-(d) and then show that it is actually a face. Conditions (a) and (d) follow from the definition of X and the fact that U (q, s; q 0 ) = 0. Condition (b) follows because q satisfies budget constraints for B = 0. Finally, condition (c) follows because S ⊆ X. To see that X is a face, note that condition (b) actually shows that X is exactly the set of minimizers of the linear function (q − q 0 ) · ω over ω ∈ Ω. Now, consider B > 0. We begin by forming a Lagrangian of Convex Program (2.1), with non-negative multipliers λ = (λ ω ) ω∈Ω :
Since the utilities are convex and finite over q ∈ R n , and q 0 is feasible with all of the constraints satisfied with strict inequalities, KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for optimality [18, Corollary 28.3.1]. KKT conditions state that q and λ solve the above problem if and only if the following hold:
• primal feasibility: U (q, ω; q 0 ) ≥ −B for all ω ∈ Ω; • dual feasibility: λ ≥ 0;
• first-order optimality: ∇ 1 L(q, λ) = 0; • complementary slackness: λ ω (U (q, ω; q 0 ) + B) = 0; for all ω ∈ Ω.
We next show that KKT conditions imply (a)-(d). Assume that KKT conditions hold. Let X be the set of outcomes with tight constraints, i.e., X = {x ∈ Ω : U (q, x; q 0 ) = −B}. For this X, the conditions (a) and (b) hold by primal feasibility and our definition of X. Note that we have either X = ∅ or X = argmin x∈Ω (q − q 0 ) · x, i.e., X is a face of M. If X = ∅, then (d) follows from our definition of X. If X = ∅, then (d) follows by primal feasibility. We prove (c) by analyzing first-order optimality. First note that:
Thus, first-order optimality is equivalent to
By complementary slackness, λ ω = 0 for ω ∈ Ω\X, so this shows (c).
For the converse, assume that (a)-(d) hold. In particular, by (c), let p(q) = c µ µ + ω∈X c ω ω where c µ , c ω ≥ 0 and c µ + ω∈X c ω = 1. If c µ > 0, then we obtain that KKT conditions hold for the given q and λ ω = c ω /c µ for ω ∈ X and λ ω = 0 for ω ∈ Ω\X. Since KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality [18, Theorem 28.3], we obtain q ∈Q(B; q 0 ).
If c µ = 0, we actually have p(q) ∈ conv(X) and X = ∅. Thus, from (a) and (d),
By non-negativity of Bregman divergence, Eq. (C.10) can only hold if B = 0 and p(q 0 ) = p(q). Feasibility of q follows by (d) and (b). To see that q is also optimal, first note that U (q, ω; q 0 ) ≥ 0 for all ω. Since µ is a convex combination of ω, the linearity of U in the second argument implies U (q, µ; q 0 ) ≥ 0. However, by arbitrage-free initialization, q 0 is optimal and U (q 0 , µ; q 0 ) = 0, so we must have U (q, µ; q 0 ) = 0 and q optimal as well.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. We prove the revised version of the theorem with the additional assumption that q 0 is arbitragefree (see Appendix C.1). If q ∈ [q 0 + K(X p(q) ) then we have q ∈Q(q 0 ) by Lemma 3.1 with X = X p(q) . For the converse, assume that q ∈Q(q 0 ). Lemma 3.1 then implies that there exists a face X such that q ∈ [q 0 + K(X)] and p(q) ∈ conv(X ∪ {µ}). By minimality of X p(q) , we must have X p(q) ⊆ X. By anti-monotonicity of witness cones, we then have q ∈ [q 0 + K(X p(q) )], finishing the proof.
C.3 Minimal face
Proposition C.6. Fix µ ∈ M. Then for any ν ∈ M, there exists the minimal face X ν with the following property: for any face X such that ν ∈ conv(X ∪ {µ}), we must have
Proof. If ν = µ then X ν = ∅ and the statement holds. Otherwise, consider the ray ρ from µ towards ν, and let ν be the last point on the ray that is contained in M. Let X ν be the unique face such that ν lies in the relative interior of conv(X ν ). 8 We will argue that this face satisfies the condition stated in the proposition. Let X be any face such that ν ∈ conv(X ∪ {µ}). Then ν = λµ + (1 − λ)ν X for ν X ∈ conv(X) and λ ∈ [0, 1). Since ν X ∈ M, it must lie on the ray ρ at some point between ν and ν . We next argue than ν ∈ conv(X). Suppose not, this means that ν = ν X , and ν X maximizes some linear function, say u ·ν, over ν ∈ M, and u · ν < u · ν X , i.e.,
Since ν = µ and ν = ν X , and the points µ, ν, ν X , ν lie on the ray ρ (in that order), there exists η > 0 such that µ − ν X = η(ν X − ν ) and thus
implying that u · µ > u · ν X and contradicting the assumption that ν X is the maximizer. Thus, ν ∈ conv(X). By a similar reasoning, we can also show that for any x ∈ X ν , we must have x ∈ X. Again, for the sake of contradiction assume that there is u such that ν is a maximizer of u ·ν overν ∈ M, but x is not. Then x = ν , and since ν ∈ ri conv(X ν ), for sufficiently small η, we have ν := ν +η(ν −x) ∈ M, and u·ν > u·ν contradicting the maximizer property of ν . Thus, X ν ⊆ X.
D IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT OF FORTNOW AND SAMI
We can use the KKT lemma (Lemma 3.1) and the continuity of the perpendiculars (Theorem F.3) to derive the impossibility result of Fortnow and Sami [8] . The result states that in the presence of budget constraints, there is no market scoring rule guaranteeing that the market prices move towards the agent belief along the connecting straight line (unless aff(M) is a line or a point).
Our construction is based on the observation that according to the KKT lemma, the solutions q must lie on a perpendicular at q 0 , and the continuity of the perpendiculars implies that p(q) is arbitrarily close to p(q 0 ) for a small enough budget. In particular, if p(q 0 ) lies in the relative interior of conv(X p(q0) ∪ {µ}) then we can assure that so does p(q), and this property does not change with small perturbations of µ-in particular, q remains a solution to the budget constrained optimization. Thus, the direction of movement of market prices is independent of small changes in µ.
This informal reasoning can be turned into the following formal argument. Assume the dimension of aff(M) is d ≥ 2. Choose µ ∈ ri M and a face X such that aff(X) is
Pick q 0 such that p(q 0 ) lies in ri conv(X ∪ {µ}), which assures that X is the minimal face for p(q 0 ). Let ν 0 denote p(q 0 ). Consider the µ-perpendicular to X at q 0 . By continuity of perpendiculars, we can pick a point ν ν 0 on the perpendicular which is arbitrarily close to ν 0 and, in particular, which still lies in ri conv(X ∪ {µ}), so its minimal face is still X. Pick q ∈ q 0 +X ⊥ such that p(q) = ν, which is possible by Proposition 4.2. We next show that actually q ∈ q 0 + K(X), which implies that q is a solution to budget constrained optimization (by Theorem 3.4).
Let u be the normal to aff(X) within aff(M) such that M lies in the non-negative half-space, i.e., all ν ∈ M can be expressed in the form ν = a + t u where a ∈ aff(X) and t ≥ 0. Thus, we can write
for some a 0 , a ν , a ω ∈ aff(X) and t 0 , t ν , t ω ≥ 0. By convexity
where Eq. (D.1) follows because (q − q 0 ) ⊥ aff(X). Since ν ν 0 along the perpendicular, we have that t ν > t 0 and so Eq. (D.1) implies
Thus, for any ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X,
showing that q ∈ q 0 +K(X), i.e., q ∈Q(q 0 ). If ν 0 , ν and µ are not on a straight line, we are done. Otherwise, slightly move µ within the affine space parallel to aff(X), so that X remains the minimal face for ν and thus q remains a solution, but ν 0 , ν and µ are no longer on a straight line.
E BUDGET ADDITIVITY: EXAMPLES
Using the KKT lemma, we illustrate on examples that budget additivity sometimes holds and sometimes does not.
Recall that budget additivity states that if several agents have the same belief and limited budgets, the sequence of their actions is equivalent to the action of a single agent with the same belief and the sum of the budgets. In the first example, we give an illustration of when this property holds. In the second example, we show how this property can be violated, and the single agent with the sum of budgets has more power in the market.
Example E.1 (Quadratic cost on a square). Consider the following outcome space and belief:
Further, consider the following market states:
The divergence of these states (and the belief µ) from individual outcomes is: With these in hand, we can now use the KKT lemma and show that q 1 = ν 1 is an optimal action at q 0 = ν 0 under belief µ for a specific budget. Since q 1 is a convex combination of ω 00 and µ, we need to show that the only tight budget constraint is due to ω 00 . We also calculate budgets required to move from q 0 and q 1 to q µ : Hence, a sequence of moves with budgets B 01 and B 1µ is equivalent to a single move with the budget B 0µ = B 01 + B 1µ . While we have shown this only for a specific sequence of budgets, results of Section 5 show that for the quadratic cost on a square, budget additivity holds for any sequence of budgets and any belief µ ∈ M.
Example E.2 (Quadratic cost on an obtuse triangle.). Now, we work out an example where the budget additivity does not hold. Consider the following outcome space and belief: The divergence of these states (and the belief µ) from individual outcomes is: Again as before, we can use the KKT lemma and show for j = 1, 2, 3, that q j = ν j is an optimal action at q j−1 = ν j−1 under belief µ, with the corresponding budgets as: The above table also shows that the budget B 0µ = 1.215 suffices to move directly from q 0 to q µ . However, note that the sum B 01 + B 12 + B 23 = 1.215 = B 0µ , but ν 3 = µ, i.e., after the sequence of optimal actions with budgets B 01 , B 12 , and B 23 , the market is still not at the belief shared by all agents, even though with the budget B 0µ , it would have reached it. Note that it is possible to achieve budget additivity by using log-partition cost instead of quadratic cost (Theorem 5.6).
F PERPENDICULARS F.1 Proofs of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We will show that condition (i) is equivalent to condition (ii) by analyzing the first order optimality conditions. Consider the problem
used to define ν λ . Assume that the minimum is attained at some ν ∈ ri dom C * . Thus, ν ∈ A ∩ (ri dom C * ). Since D(q, ν ) is subdifferentiable at ν , the first order optimality implies that
Then we can pick λ such that ν ∈ A λ , and for this λ, we obtain that condition (F.2) holds and hence ν solves problem (F.1). Since ν ∈ ri dom C * , we obtain that ν ∈ im γ.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let γ be the a 1 -perpendicular to A 0 at q . Since the ambient space A for both perpendiculars is the same, by Proposition 4.2(ii), it suffices to show that q + A ⊥ 0 = q + A ⊥ 0 . However, this follows by the assumption of the theorem, since q − q ∈ A ⊥ 0 .
F.2 Continuity of perpendiculars
In this section, we prove two important properties of perpendiculars: (a) they are continuous maps; (b) intersections of perpendiculars with compact convex sets correspond to compact sets of market states up to certain "irrelevant displacements". To define these irrelevant displacements, let L be the linear space parallel to aff(dom C * ). Then the displacements of market state within L ⊥ are irrelevant in the sense that they have no effect on the Bregman divergence and hence by Eq. (4.1) also no effect on the utility function. Specifically, D(q + u, ν) = D(q, ν) for all u ∈ L ⊥ (see next proposition). For instance, for LMSR over a simplex, the irrelevant displacements are of the form λ 1 where λ ∈ R and 1 is the all-ones vector.
Proposition F.1. Let L be the linear space parallel to aff(dom C * ). Then for all q ∈ R n and u ∈ L
Proof. If ν ∈ dom C * then the statement obviously holds. Pick ν ∈ dom C * , q ∈ R n and u ∈ L ⊥ . By the Mean Value Theorem, we can write
for someq. Letν := ∇C(q) ∈ dom C * . Then we can write
The following result of Rockafellar [18] will be instrumental in proving continuity properties of the perpendicular. It is paraphrased for our setting. The notation int refers to the topological interior of the set. is non-empty, closed and bounded. Now we are ready to state and prove the continuity of perpendiculars:
Theorem F.3. Let γ be the a 1 -perpendicular to A 0 at q, and K ⊆ ri dom C * be a closed bounded convex set intersecting im γ.
(a) The map γ is continuous and Λ is open.
where C is compact and ⊕ denotes a direct sum of vector spaces.
Proof. Throughout the proof, let
Note that F is strictly convex on ri dom C * . We will be also making frequent use of the fact that F is continuous on ri dom C * (because C * is continuous on ri dom C * by Theorem 10.1 of Rockafellar [18]). Let · denote the usual Euclidean norm. Let a 0 = argmin a∈A0 a 1 − a , i.e., (a 1 − a 0 ) ∈ A ⊥ 0 . Let A = aff(A 0 ∪ {a 1 }) and recall that
We use the notation B(ν, r; M ) := {ν ∈ M : ν − ν ≤ r} for the Euclidean ball relative to set M , and S(ν, r; M ) := {ν ∈ M : ν − ν = r} for the Euclidean sphere relative to set M .
Part (a).
We need to show that γ is continuous. Let λ ∈ Λ, i.e., ν λ ∈ ri dom C * . Choose a sufficiently small r > 0 such that the ball B := B(ν λ , r; A) is contained in ri dom C * . To show the continuity of γ and openness of Λ, it suffices to show that if λ is close enough to λ then ν λ ∈ B.
Let ε = r/ √ 2. Consider the sphere S λ := S(ν λ , ε; A λ ) ⊆ ri dom C * . This sphere is a compact set, so F attains the minimum on S λ . By strict convexity of F and the optimality of ν λ , this minimum must be bounded away from F (ν λ ). Thus, there exists δ > 0 such that
(F.3) Let δ = δ/3. Since F is continuous on ri dom C * , it is uniformly continuous on B and thus there exists ε ∈ (0, ε] such that
Let B λ := B(ν λ , ε; A λ ) be the closed ball with S λ as the border. For any λ , let
Note that if |λ − λ| ≤ ε , then B λ ⊆ B, because (λ − λ) 2 + ε 2 ≤ ε √ 2 = r. So we can use the above uniform continuity result and write:
By convexity of F , this means that ν λ ∈ B λ . This proves that ν λ ∈ B provided that |λ − λ| ≤ ε , thus proving the continuity of γ at λ.
Part (b).
We first show that the set M is closed and then that it is bounded, except for directions in 0 ⊕ L ⊥ . Since K ⊆ ri dom C * , we can use Proposition 4.2 to write the set M as
where we used the identity p −1 (ν ) = ∂C * (ν ) valid for all ν . The closedness follows, because the set of pairs {(ν , q ) : ν ∈ R n , q ∈ ∂C * (ν )} is closed [18, Theorem 24.4].
Denote the projections of M on its two components as
To show boundedness, we only need to analyze M 2 since M 1 ⊆ K. By Eq. (F.5), it in fact suffices to show that the set ∂C
We would like to appeal to Theorem F.2, but we cannot do it directly, because it is stated for the interior rather than the relative interior. For ν ∈ ri dom C * , we have ∂C * (ν) = ∅, and using the fact that
, we obtain that
for some set S ⊆ L. This set S coincides with subdifferential when C * (ν) is only viewed as a function over aff(dom C * ). By applying Theorem F.2 to this restriction, we then indeed obtain that Proof. We first show that Definition 5.1 (general acute angles) implies Definition 3.8 (Euclidean acute angles). Assume that the general acute angles hold for X. Letν ∈ M and ν be its projection on aff(X). Ifν = ν then angles betweenν, ν and ω ∈ Ω are non-obtuse in the sense that (ν − ν) · (ω − ν) ≥ 0. Ifν = ν, then let γ be theν-perpendicular to X at ν (note that p is the identity map, so ν is both a state and the corresponding price vector). Note thatν ν and thus by the general acute angles assumption
Since ν ∈ aff(X), we obtain that (ν − ν) · (ω − ν) ≥ 0, i.e., the Euclidean acute angles hold.
Conversely, assume that the Euclidean acute angles hold. Let γ be a µ-perpendicular to a face X for some µ ∈ M and ν ν be two points in im γ such that ν ∈ M. We need to show that p
If ν = ν then (G.1) holds. Otherwise, we can write ν = ν + u X + λ(µ −ν) for an arbitraryν ∈ aff(X), a suitable λ > 0 and u X from the linear space parallel with aff(X). Pickν ∈ ri conv(X) (and the corresponding λ and u X ). We claim that there is a small enough η > 0 such that ν :=ν + η(ν − ν) ∈ M. This follows, because from our previous reasoning, ν =ν + ηu X + ηλ(µ −ν), and for sufficiently small η > 0, we have [ν + ηλ(µ −ν)] ∈ ri conv(X ∪ {µ}) and then also for sufficiently small η, [ν + ηλ(µ −ν) + ηu X ] ∈ ri conv(X ∪ {µ}) ⊆ M. Thus, by the Euclidean acute angles,
Sinceν −ν = η(ν − ν) and (ν − ν) ⊥ (x −ν) for all x ∈ X, we also obtain
proving (G.1) and finishing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let L be the linear space parallel to aff(X). First show that the acute angles imply the inclusion of the projection in an acute cone. Note that the inclusion is either true for all a 0 ∈ aff(X) or none, so we can without loss of generality choose a 0 ∈ conv(X). Let ω 1 , ω 2 ∈ Ω and let ω 1 and ω 2 be their projections to A , thus
We need to show that
If ω 1 ∈ aff(X) then ω 1 = a 0 and the statement holds. Assume that ω 1 ∈ aff(X) and let γ be the ω 1 -perpendicular to X at a 0 . Let ω 1 ∈ im γ be the projection of ω 1 on im γ. Thus, we also have
and also ω 1 a 0 . Now by the acute angles assumption, ω 1 − a 0 ∈ K(X), i.e., for any x ∈ X,
Combining this with the previous identities, we obtain
where the first equality follows because ω 1 − a 0 ∈ L ⊥ and
the second equality follows because ω 2 − a 0 ∈ L ⊥ and
For the converse, assume that the inclusion of the projection of M in an affine acute cone holds. Let γ be the µ-perpendicular to X at ν for some µ, ν ∈ M and let ν ν. We need to show that ν −ν ∈ K(X). Note that 0 ∈ K(X), so we only analyze ν = ν. Let µ be the projection of µ on im γ and a 0 be the intersection of im γ with aff(X). Note that ν − ν = η(µ − a 0 ) for a suitable η > 0, so it suffices to show that µ − a 0 ∈ K(X). Pick ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X and let ω be the projection of ω into A := a 0 + X ⊥ . Since the projection of M into A is contained in an affine acute cone with the vertex a 0 , we obtain
showing that the acute angles hold.
Proof of Corollary 5.4. We will show that the assumption of Theorem 5.3 holds. Since the assumption is invariant under rigid transformations, we can just consider the case a 0 = 0 ∈ X. In this case, the projection of Ω is a lower dimensional hypercube (corresponding to a subset of Ω).
Note that Ω lies in the non-negative orthant and the nonnegative orthant is an acute cone with the vertex a 0 = 0, so the assumption of Theorem 5.3 holds and hence the acute angles hold for the hypercube.
Proof of Corollary 5.5. Again, by symmetry, it suffices to consider faces of the form X = {e i : i ∈ [k]} for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let a 0 = e 1 . The affine space A is described by
where we use notation a[i] to denote the i-th coordinate. The projection of e j for j > k into A is of the form
The only solution of the above form that lies in A is obtained by setting α j [i] = −1/k, yielding
Therefore, for any pair of projections e j , e j for j, j > k, and j = j , we have
so the projection of Ω is in an acute cone, i.e., acute angles hold.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. We begin by characterizing an a 1 -perpendicular to a face X = Ω at q. Let ν := p(q) ∈ aff(X), so the ambient space of the perpendicular is aff(X ∪ {ν}). Thus, for a given X and q, we will have the same im γ and the same order on ν ∈ im γ for any valid a 1 ∈M which allows to define the a 1 -perpendicular to X at q. Recall that P q is the probability measure over Ω defined by P q (ω) = e q·ω−C(q) and note that P q (ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Recall that
Let X c = Ω\X. Separate ν into components corresponding to x ∈ X and ω ∈ X c :
Since ν X ∈ aff(X), we have
We will show that im γ consists exactly of the points (1 − α)ν X +αν X c forα ∈ (0, 1).
Consider ν ∈ im γ and q ∈ p −1 (ν ) ∩ (q + X ⊥ ). For any x , x ∈ X, we have
and hence
Since this holds for arbitrary x, x ∈ X, we obtain
Since ν is in the ambient space of the perpendicular, which is aff(X ∪ {ν}), by Eq. (G.2), we obtain ν ∈ aff(X ∪ {ν X c }) , so ν can be written in the form
for some α(x) ∈ R for x ∈ X. Also,
By the affine independence of Ω, we therefore must have α(x) = P q (x). Plugging this into Eq. (G.4), we obtain
where the second equality follows by Eq. (G.3). Thus, indeed ν = (1 −α)ν X +αν X c forα = P q (X c ).
So far we have shown that im γ ⊆ J (0,1) ; we next argue that J (0,1) ⊆ im γ. We do this by exploiting the continuity properties of γ.
For anyα, note that
for a suitable λ. Letα 0 and λ 0 be the values associated with ν = p(q); note that both are greater than zero. Then, for any λ, theα such that Now we are ready to prove the theorem. Let ν ∈ im γ such that ν ν, and let q ∈ p −1 (ν), q ∈ p −1 (ν ). Use the notation P := P q and P := P q , and write
For ω ∈ X c , our characterization of the perpendicular implies that P (x) ≥ P (x) and P (ω) ≤ P (ω ) since ν has a larger (or equal) coefficientα than ν, because it is further (or equally) away from ν X . Thus, the above expression is non-negative, yielding the acute angles property.
Proof of Theorem 5.7. Let µ ∈M, q ∈ p −1 (M) and let im γ be the µ-perpendicular to X at q. Note that the perpendicular is well defined only if X is a singleton, say X = {x}, and µ = x. Let {x } be the other singleton face of M. Thus, im γ = aff({x, x }) ∩ (ri dom C * ) with the direction from x towards x . Note that K(X) = {u : u · (x − x) ≥ 0}. Let ν = p(q) and let ν ν, i.e., ν − ν = λ(x − x) for some λ > 0. Pick q ∈ p −1 (ν ), which exists, because ν ∈ ri dom C * . By convexity, we have
i.e., q − q ∈ K(X).
Proof of Theorem 5.8. Let M 1 = conv(Ω 1 ) and M 2 = (conv Ω 2 ). We first argue that M = conv(
, for some probability measure P i on Ω i , we have E ωi∼Pi [ω i ] = ν i . Defining the probability measure P on Ω by P (ω 1 , ω 2 ) = P 1 (ω 1 )P 2 (ω 2 ), we obtain
We next show that X is a face of M if and only if X = X 1 × X 2 where X 1 is a face of M 1 and X 2 is a face of M 2 . A face X of M is characterized by a vector u and a scalar c such that
If X 1 is a face of M 1 characterized by u 1 and c 1 , and X 2 is a face of M 2 characterized by u 2 and c 2 , then we immediately obtain that X 1 × X 2 is a face of M characterized by u = (u 1 , u 2 ) and c = c 1 + c 2 . Conversely, assume X is a face of M characterized by u = (u 1 , u 2 ) and c. We first show that X is a Cartesian product. We proceed by contradiction and assume that (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X and (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X, but (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X. By assumption:
Summing the above three yields:
which is a contradiction with X being a face. By symmetry, we also obtain (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X, hence X = X 1 ×X 2 for some X 1 ⊆ Ω 1 and X 2 ⊆ Ω 2 . Let (x 1 , x 2 ) be some element of X. Note that X 1 must be a face of M 1 characterized by u 1 and c 1 := u 1 · x 1 , because otherwise, there would exist
which would contradict X being a face, since (ω 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X. By symmetry, we also obtain that X 2 is a face of M 2 .
Let γ be the a-perpendicular to X at q, where a = (a 1 , a 2 ), X = X 1 × X 2 and q = (q 1 , q 2 ). Note that a ∈M,
The optimization of D(q, ν) over A λ in the definition of the perpendicular decomposes into independent convex problems in ν 1 and ν 2 , because aff(X) = aff(X 1 )×aff(X 2 ) and D(q, ν) = D 1 (q 1 , ν 1 )+D 2 (q 2 , ν 2 ), where D 1 and D 2 are the divergences derived from C 1 and C 2 . Thus, for any point ν ∈ im γ such that ν p(q), we obtain that for i ∈ {1, 2} the components ν i lie on the a i -perpendicular to X i at q i and ν i p i (q i ). Let x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X and ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ Ω. Then by acute angles assumption, we can choose q i ∈ p
Let q = (q 1 , q 2 ). Note that q ∈ p −1 (ν ). We will argue that also (q − q) ∈ K(X):
where the last inequality follows, because (q i − q i ) ∈ K(X i ). Thus, the acute angles assumption holds for C and Ω.
H PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2
In this section we give the complete proof of Theorem 5.2, with the revised definition of budget additivity, which requires that q 0 be arbitrage-free (see Appendix C.1). The proof proceeds in several steps. Let ν 0 = p(q 0 ). Assuming acute angles, we begin by constructing an oriented curve L joining ν 0 with µ, by sequentially choosing portions of perpendiculars for monotonically decreasing active sets. We then show that budget additivity holds for any solutions with prices in L, and finally show that the curve L is the locus of the optimal prices of solutionsQ(q 0 ), as well as optimal prices of solutionsQ(q) for any q ∈Q(q 0 ).
Part 1: Construction of the solution path L In this part, we construct:
• a sequence of prices ν 0 , ν 1 , . . . , ν k with ν 0 = p(q 0 ) and ν k = µ • a sequence of oriented curves 0 , . . . , k−1 where each i goes from ν i to ν i+1 • a monotone sequence of sets Ω ⊇ X 0 ⊃ X 1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ X k = ∅, such that the following minimality property holds: X i is the minimal face for all ν ∈ (im i )\{ν i+1 } for i ≤ k − 1, and X k is the minimal face for ν k .
1. ν 1 = µ; in this case we are done; 2. ν 1 lies on a lower-dimensional face of conv(X 0 ∪ {µ}); in this case, we pick some q 1 ∈ p −1 (ν 1 ) ∩ [q 0 + K(X 0 )], which can be done by the acute angles assumption, and use the above construction again, starting with q 1 , and obtaining a new set X 1 ⊂ X 0 and a new segment 1 ; and iterate.
The above construction yields a specific sequence of q i ∈ p −1 (ν i ) ∩ [q i−1 + K(X i−1 )]. We will now show that actually q i ∈ p −1 (ν i ) ∩ (q 0 + X ⊥ i−1 ) and that the construction of L is independent of the specific q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q k−1 chosen. To begin, note that from our construction, we can write q i = q 0 + u 0 + u 1 + . . . + u i−1 for some u j ∈ K(X j ) ⊆ X ⊥ j . Since X i ⊆ X j for j = 1, . . . , i − 1, we actually have u j ∈ X ⊥ i−1 , so q i ∈ (q 0 + X ⊥ i−1 ). Note that X ⊥ i−1 ⊆ X ⊥ i , and according to Proposition 4.3, any q i ∈ p −1 (ν i ) ∩ (q 0 + X ⊥ i ) yields the same µ-perpendicular to aff(X i ) and hence the same segment i . By induction it therefore follows that the segments 0 , . . . , k−1 are uniquely determined by our construction regardless of the specific q 1 , . . . , q k−1 .
Part 1': The solution path starting at a midpoint Let ν ∈ im L, and q ∈ p −1 (ν) ∩ (q 0 + X ⊥ ν ), and let L be the solution path if the initial state were q rather than q 0 . By a similar reasoning as in the previous paragraph, we see that L is a restriction of L starting with ν.
Part 2: Budget additivity for points on L Let ν, ν ∈ im L such that ν ν . Let q ∈Q(ν; q 0 ) and q ∈Q(ν ; q) such that q ∈Q(B; q 0 ) and q ∈Q(B ; q). Note that by Proposition C.2, q is arbitrage-free. In this part we show that q ∈Q(B + B ; q 0 ).
First, consider the case that ν = µ. To see that q ∈ Q(B + B ; q 0 ), first note that the constraints of Convex Program (2.1) hold, because U (q , ω; q 0 ) = U (q , ω; q) + U (q, ω; q 0 ) ≥ −B − B for all ω by path independence of the utility function. As noted in the introduction, in the absence of constraints, the utility U (q, µ; q 0 ) is maximized at anyq with p(q) = µ. Thus, q is a global maximizer of the utility and satisfies the constraints, so q ∈Q(B + B ; q 0 ). If ν = µ, we must also have ν = µ and the statement holds by previous reasoning.
In the remainder, we only analyze the case ν ν ≺ µ. This means that ν ∈ (im i )\{ν i+1 } and ν ∈ (im j )\{ν j+1 } for i ≤ j. By Theorem 3.4, we therefore must have q ∈ [q 0 + K(X i )] and q ∈ [q + K(X j )]. By anti-monotonicity of witness cones, K(X j ) ⊇ K(X i ) and hence, q ∈ [q 0 + K(X j )], yielding q ∈Q(ν ; q 0 ) .
We now argue that the budgets add up. Let x ∈ X j ⊆ X i . By Lemma 3.1, we obtain that q ∈Q(B; q 0 ) for B = −U (q, x; q 0 ) , q ∈Q(B ; q) for B = −U (q , x; q) , q ∈Q(B; q 0 ) forB = −U (q , x; q 0 ) .
However, by path independence of the utility function B = −U (q , x; q 0 ) = −U (q , x; q)−U (q, x; q 0 ) = B +B.
Part 3: L as the locus of all solutions In this part we show thatQ (q 0 ) = ν∈im LQ (ν; q 0 ) .
We will begin by defining sets of budgets for which the optimal price is ν and show that their union across all ν ∈ im L is a closed interval. Since both ν 0 , µ ∈ im L, this will mean that we have included price vectors across all possible budgets. The statement of Part 3 will then follow by Theorem 2.2.
i=0 X i and let B(q) := −U (q, x; q 0 ). Further, for ν ∈ im i , let
From Corollary 3.5, we know that for ν ∈ (im i )\{ν i+1 }, B i (ν) is exactly the set of budgets for which ν is the optimal price vector. The set B i (ν i+1 ) is potentially only a subset of such budgets (corresponding to X i being the tight set, rather than the actual minimal set X i+1 ). First we show that B i (ν) is non-empty for ν ∈ im i . Let ν ∈ im i . By acute angles assumption, there exists q ∈ p −1 (ν) ∩ [q i + K(X i )]. Furthermore, q j ∈ [q j−1 + K(X j−1 )] for j = 1, . . . , i, so we can write q = q 0 + u 0 + · · · + u i where u j ∈ K(X j ). By anti-monotonicity of witness cones, K(X j ) ⊆ K(X i ) for j = 1, . . . , i, so we actually have u j ∈ K(X i ) and thus q ∈ [q 0 + K(X i )], proving that the set B i (ν) is non-empty.
We will next show that
is an interval.
Consider a fixed ν ∈ im i . For q ∈ p −1 (ν), we have C(q) = q · ν − C * (ν), i.e., B(q) is linear in q over q ∈ p −1 (ν). Since the set p −1 (ν) is closed and convex, so is p −1 (ν) ∩ [q 0 + K(X i )]. The latter set is also nonempty, hence the set B i (ν) must be a non-empty closed interval. Let B be a sequence of ν t ∈ i , ν t ν such that lim t→∞ ν t = ν. Pick q t such that (ν t , q t ) ∈ C and B(q t ) = B max i (ν t ). By compactness, the sequence {(ν t , q t )} Part 4: Proof of the theorem Let B, B ≥ 0 and q ∈ Q(B; q 0 ) and q ∈Q(B ; q). From Parts 3 and 3', we know that q ∈Q(ν; q 0 ) and q ∈Q(ν ; q) for some ν, ν ∈ im L such that ν ν . By Part 2, we therefore obtain that q ∈ Q(B + B ; q 0 ), proving the theorem.
